Abstract A core concept is a solution concept on the class of balanced games that exclusively selects core allocations. We show that every continuous core concept that satisfies both the equal treatment property and a new property called independence of irrelevant core allocations (IIC) necessarily selects egalitarian allocations. IIC requires that, if the core concept selects a certain core allocation for a given game, and this allocation is still a core allocation for a new game with a core that is contained in the core of the first game, then the core concept also chooses this allocation as the solution to the new game. When we replace the continuity requirement by a weak version of additivity we obtain an axiomatization of the egalitarian solution concept that assigns to each balanced game the core allocation minimizing the Euclidean distance to the equal share allocation.
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Introduction
Egalitarianism is the strife of a community to spread the total wealth of the community as equally as possible among its members, while satisfying certain stability requirements of the allocation. The notion of egalitarianism is frequently used outside the theory of transferable utility games. See for example Thomson (1994) for applications in bargaining theory and Moulin (1988) for applications in welfare economics. Dutta and Ray (1989) first introduced egalitarianism 1 for TU-games. They showed that, for their definition of an egalitarian allocation, a TU-game can have at most one such allocation. They also showed that for convex games the egalitarian allocation always exists and that it is an element of the core. On the other hand, they present two examples, one showing that the egalitarian allocation may exist for games with an empty core and another one showing that the egalitarian allocation need not be a core element even if the core is not empty. Arin and Iñarra (2001) used another definition of egalitarian allocations. The difference does not lie in the notion of egalitarianism, 2 but in a the notion of stability they use. Dutta and Ray (1989) define stability of a given allocation recursively, by requiring that no coalition can object to it using an allocation that is both stable with respect to the coalition and better for all of its members. Arin and Iñarra (2001) require that the allocation be in the core of the game. As a consequence, the latter type of egalitarian allocation exists for a given game precisely when the core of the game is not empty. Arin and Iñarra (2001) showed that their definition coincides with the definition in Dutta and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games. This, together with the guarantee of existence for a relatively large and manageable class of games, makes the notion of Arin and Iñarra an interesting alternative for the notion of Dutta and Ray. The most prominent drawback of the definition of Arin and Iñarra is that more than one allocation may be egalitarian. For this reason we will introduce, in Sect. 3, several solution concepts that assign exactly one egalitarian allocation (according to the definition of Arin and Iñarra) to each balanced game.
An objective way to support the rationale of a certain solution concept (no matter whether it is single valued or set valued) is through axiomatizations. For example, the solution concept of Dutta and Ray has been axiomatized on the class of convex games, by Dutta (1990) ; Klijn et al. (1998) . In this paper, we aim for the axiomatiza-tion of egalitarian solution concepts on the larger class of balanced games. While the axiomatizations of the Dutta and Ray solution are all based on some form of consistency (both Hart-Mas-Colell and Maschler-Davis reduced games can be used, even both at once), we will use an axiom that is closely related to the property known as independence of irrelevant alternatives. The connection of this property with egalitarianism has already been established outside the context of TU-games. More precisely, we will show, in Sect. 4, that any continuous core concept 3 that satisfies the equal treatment property and a property we called independence of irrelevant core allocations (IIC) must necessarily be egalitarian. By replacing continuity with a weak version of additivity, 4 we obtain, in Sect. 5, an axiomatization of the egalitarian solution concept known as the least squares solution concept.
Preliminaries
Let v : 2 N → R be a TU-game on the player set N = {1, . . . , n}. We assume n ≥ 2 throughout. The central problem is how to allocate the total gain v(N ) among the players.
An allocation is a vector x ∈ R N . The ith coordinate x i of the allocation x represents the payoff to player i ∈ N . For any subset of players S ⊆ N , their aggregate payoff i∈S x i is denoted by x(S). An allocation x is efficient if it distributes the worth of the grand coalition among the players, i.e. if x(N ) = v(N ). An efficient allocation x is called a core allocation if
The set C(v) of core allocations is called the core of the game v. We restrict attention to games with a non-empty core, that is, to balanced games (see Bondareva 1963; Shapley 1967) .
For two players k and l in a game v, an efficient allocation x, and a real number α > 0, we say that (k, l, x, α) is an equalizing bilateral transfer (of size α from k to l with respect to x) if
A core allocation x is egalitarian if no core allocation y is the result of an equalizing bilateral transfer with respect to x. A core allocation x is strongly egalitarian if no core allocation y is the result of a finite sequence of equalizing bilateral transfers starting from x.
For both notions we will frequently use alternative descriptions. We will briefly explain these. A coalition S is said to be tight at an allocation x if
x(S) = v(S).
The collection of all tight coalitions at x is denoted by T (v, x) . A core allocation x is egalitarian if and only if for any pair of players k and l with x k > x l there exists a coalition S ∈ T (v, x) with k ∈ S and l / ∈ S. The alternative description of strong egalitarianism is a bit more complicated. Let x be an allocation in R n . By x we denote the vector that results from x by permuting the coordinates of x in such a way that x 1 ≥ x 2 ≥ · · · ≥ x n . We say that the vector x Lorenz dominates the vector y if
and if at least one of these inequalities is strict. Now, Lemma 2 of Hardy et al. (1952) implies that a core allocation y Lorenz dominates another core allocation x only if y can be obtained from x by a finite sequence of equalizing bilateral transfers. Hence, since the converse of this Lemma is trivial, a core element is strongly egalitarian if and only if it is undominated in the sense of Lorenz. We use this characterization of strong egalitarianism in terms of the Lorenz criterion freely throughout the paper. We also frequently use the term Lorenz allocation for a strongly egalitarian core allocation.
Observe that the equal share allocation Es(v) (the allocation that allocates Note that v(S ∪ {1}) ≥ v(S ∪ {2}) for all S ⊆ N \ {1, 2}. It follows that an equalizing transfer from 2 to 1 is possible if x 1 < x 2 for some core element x. Hence, any egalitarian allocation x must satisfy x 1 ≥ x 2 . We also have x 2 = x 3 , since v(S ∪{2}) = v(S ∪ {3}) for all S ⊆ N \ {2, 3}, and
, since the equal share allocation is not in the core. Therefore, x 1 + x 2 = x 1 + x 3 = 7, since an equalizing transfer from player 1 to player 4 would be possible in case x 1 + x 2 = x 1 + x 3 > 7. We conclude that all egalitarian allocations are of the form
with 2 1 2 ≤ λ ≤ 3 1 2 . Finally, observe that none of these allocations Lorenz dominates any of the other allocations. Hence, these are indeed also all Lorenz allocations.
Some egalitarian concepts
Since a balanced game may have more than one core allocation, it makes sense to study solution concepts that select precisely one core allocation for each balanced game. We call such a solution concept a core concept. We say that a core concept is an egalitarian concept if it assigns only egalitarian core allocations. It is called a Lorenz concept if it exclusively assigns Lorenz allocations.
Definition 1 For a balanced game v, the least squares solution LS(v) is defined as the unique allocation x in C(v) for which x ≤ y for all y ∈ C(v). Here, x denotes the Euclidean length i∈N x 2 i of x.
Notice that LS is indeed a Lorenz concept, since the value of · decreases whenever an equalizing bilateral transfer is made. A useful geometric interpretation of LS(v) is that it is the unique point in C(v) that minimizes the Euclidean distance to Es(v), the ideal, or maybe better, ultimate, egalitarian allocation.
The LS concept is not the only egalitarian core concept. For example, Arin and Iñarra (2001) introduced the lexmax and the lexmin concept. The definition of these concepts is as follows. An allocation x said to be preferred to another allocation y if x = y and if x i < y i for the first coordinate i with x i = y i , i.e. if the vector x is lexicographically smaller than y. This is denoted by x ≺ lex y. By x lex y we mean x = y or x ≺ lex y.
Definition 2 For a balanced game v, the lexmax solution Lmax(v) is defined as the set of most preferred core allocations, i.e.
Similarly, the lexmin solution Lmin(v) is defined as
It is easy to prove that allocations in Lmax(v) and Lmin(v) are Lorenz allocations, and it follows from Lemma 1.1 in Moulin (1988) that Lmax(v) and Lmin(v) consist of a unique core allocation for every game v. Therefore, we may interpret Lmax and Lmin as Lorenz concepts and we will abuse notation slightly by writing e.g. x = Lmax(v) instead of x ∈ Lmax(v). In the following, we will provide a proof for the continuity of the Lmax concept. A similar proof can be given for Lmin. The proof closely resembles the proof of Kohlberg (1971) for uniqueness and continuity of the nucleolus. 5 Also, a similar proof for the continuity of the set of all Lorenz allocations was given in Hougaard et al. (2001) .
Definition 3 Let I = (I 1 , . . . , I p ) be an ordered partition of N and let T be a collection of subsets of N . We say that the pair (I, T ) has property I if z = 0 is the unique solution to the following system of (in)equalities.
Definition 4 Given an allocation x, we define
and for k ≥ 2 we define I k (x) ⊆ N recursively by
) of coalitions is called the ordered partition associated with x. Using this terminology, we get the following characterization of the Lmax(v) allocation.
Lemma 1 Let v be a balanced game and let x ∈ C(v). Then x = Lmax(v) ⇔ the pair (I(x), T (v, x)) has property I.
Proof Necessity: suppose that (I(x), T (v, x)) does not have property I. Then there exists a z = 0 that satisfies conditions (1) till (3). Let k = min{ | there is an i ∈ I (x) with z i = 0}.
Let i ∈ I k (x) such that z i = 0. Then z i < 0 by (3). Therefore x + z ≺ lex x for sufficiently small > 0. Also, by (1) and (2), x + z ∈ C(v) for > 0 sufficiently small. Hence, x cannot be equal to Lmax(v).
Sufficiency: (v, x) , which shows (2). To prove (3), let k ∈ {1, . . . , p} and assume
Let i * ∈ I k (x). It remains to show that z i * ≤ 0. Without loss of generality we can assume that x = x and y i ≥ y j for all i, j ∈ I k (x) with i ≤ j. (This can be achieved by permuting the player set if necessary.) Since y lex y lex x = x, z i * ≤ 0 by Eq. ( * ).
Before we go on to prove that Lmax is continuous, we introduce the following terminology. We say that
etc. It is easy to see that, if (I, T ) has property I, then also (J , S) has property I if it is derived from (I, T ).

Theorem 1 The core concept Lmax is continuous.
Proof Let (v k ) k∈N be a sequence of balanced games converging to v. Denote, for every k ∈ N, Lmax(v k ) by x k . Since the core correspondence is compact valued and continuous, we know that the sequence (x k ) k∈N is bounded. Thus, we have to show that every convergent subsequence of (x k ) k∈N converges to Lmax(x). Assume without loss of generality that (x k ) k∈N converges to x. Consider the sequence
Since there are only finitely ordered partitions and only finitely many collections of coalitions, we can assume without loss of generality that there is a pair (I, T ) such
By Lemma 1, (I, T ) has property I. Since all weak inequalities are preserved in passing to the limit, it follows that (I(x), T (v, x) ) is derived from (I, T ). We conclude that (I(x), T (v, x) ) has property I as well. By Lemma 1, x = Lmax(v).
The LS solution minimizes a continuous and strictly convex function over the core of the game. Since the core is compact-valued and continuous, it follows immediately that LS is also continuous. Therefore, all three concepts Lmax, Lmin and LS are continuous (CON).
We now introduce another property that is also shared by all three of the solutions LS, Lmax and Lmin. Informally, this property states that a chosen core allocation should not be discarded if it is still available in a smaller core. The interpretation of this is that only "irrelevant" core allocations have disappeared, hence there is no reason to change. 
Sufficient conditions for egalitarianism
We have seen that the Lorenz concepts Lmax, Lmin and LS all satisfy IIC, ETP and CON. Hence, these three properties do not single out a unique core concept when n ≥ 4. 6 It is also not true that every egalitarian solution concept satisfies IIC or CON (egalitarian solution concepts always satisfy ETP). 7 We show however that every core 6 For the game v in Example 1, one can check that Lmax(v) = 3 1 2 , 3 1 2 , 3 1 2 , 1 1 2 , Lmin(v) = 4 1 2 , 2 1 2 , 2 1 2 , 2 1 2 , and LS(v) = (4, 3, 3, 2) (since for λ = 3 the squared distance of an arbitrary Lorenz point (7 − λ, λ, λ, 5 − λ) to the origin, i.e. (7 − λ) 2 + 2λ 2 + (5 − λ) 2 , is minimized). So the concepts are indeed different. 7 Using Example 1 it is straightforward to construct an egalitarian concept that is not continuous. concept satisfying IIC, ETP and CON is egalitarian. We will first prove this statement for a special class of games.
Lemma 2 Let φ be a core concept that satisfies ETP and IIC. Let v be a game for which the equal share allocation Es(v) is an element of the core of v. Then φ(v) = Es(v).
Proof Let v be a game such that Es(v) is an element of the core of v. Define m := min{v(S) | S ⊆ N } and define the game w by
Since w ≤ v and w(N ) = v(N ), we have Es(v) ∈ C(v) ⊆ C(w). Hence, w is a balanced game and it immediately follows from ETP that φ(w) = Es(v). Applying IIC we also find that φ(v) equals Es(v).
For a core concept that satisfies IIC, the solution is not discarded if the core shrinks and the solution stays available, by definition. If the core concept is also continuous, then the solution is not discarded even if the core grows, provided that the growth is not in the neighborhood of the solution. The following lemma formalizes this statement.
Lemma 3 Let φ be a core concept satisfying IIC and CON. Let v and w be two balanced games such that φ(v) ∈ C(w), and w(S) = v(S) for every S ∈ T (v, φ(v)). Then φ(w) = φ(v).
Proof Let φ, v and w be as described above. For every λ ∈ [0, 1] define the (balanced) game u(λ) by u(λ) := λw
This maximum exists, since φ is continuous. Clearly we only need to show that λ = 1. Suppose that λ < 1. We derive a contradiction. Consider a coalition S for which
w(S) = v(S). By assumption φ(v)(S) > v(S), and hence φ(u(λ))(S) = φ(v)(S) > v(S).
Since φ is continuous and there are only finitely many coalitions S with w(S) = v(S), we can find a number µ > λ such that we still have φ(u(µ))(S) > v(S) for all such coalitions S. Define the game u * by, for all S, u * (S) = max{u(µ)(S), v(S)}. Since for all remaining coalitions S, the ones with w(S) = v(S), we have φ(u(µ))(S) ≥ u(µ)(S) = µw(S) + (1 − µ)v(S) = v(S)
it follows that φ(u(µ)) ∈ C(u * ). However, also φ(v) ∈ C(u * ) since φ(v) ∈ C(u(λ)) for all λ by assumption. Therefore, since both u * ≥ v and u * ≥ u(µ), φ(v) = φ(u * ) = φ(u(µ)) by IIC. Contradiction. Now, we can prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 2 Every core concept on the class of balanced games that satisfies IIC, ETP and CON is egalitarian.
Proof Let φ be a core concept that satisfies the axioms IIC, ETP and CON, and let v be a balanced game. Assume that we have two players k and l such that φ(v) k > φ(v) l . By the alternative description of egalitarianism we have to show that there is a coalition S with k ∈ S and l / ∈ S such that φ(v)(S) = v(S). Let B denote the collection of coalitions S with k ∈ S and l / ∈ S. Assume conversely that φ(v)(S) > v(S) for every S ∈ B. We will derive a contradiction by showing that φ(v) k = φ(v) l . Construct the auxiliary game w as follows.
We first show that φ(v) ∈ C(w). Clearly φ(v)(S) ≥ v(S) = w(S) for S / ∈ B. For S ∈ B, φ(v)(S) > φ(v)((S ∪ {l}) \ {k}) ≥ v((S ∪ {l}) \ {k}) = w(S).
Now take a coalition S with w(S) = v(S). Necessarily S ∈ B. Thus φ(v)(S) > v(S) by assumption. It follows from Lemma 3 that φ(v) = φ(w).
Finally notice that players k and l are symmetric in w.
We show that all three requirements in Theorem 2 are necessary to ensure egalitarianism. To see that ETP and CON are not sufficient, notice that the nucleolus satisfies these two properties, while it is not egalitarian. Let φ denote the core concept that assigns the lexicographically maximal vector in C(v) to any balanced game v. (It is indeed a core concept, since the core is compact and convex, hence the lexicographically maximal vector in C(v) is uniquely determined.) Then φ is IIC, and it also satisfies CON, which can be shown using an appropriately adapted version 8 of the proof of the continuity of Lmax. Clearly, φ is not egalitarian, which shows that IIC and CON are not sufficient to ensure egalitarianism.
Also, the requirements of ETP and IIC are not enough to ensure that a core concept is egalitarian on the class of balanced games, as the following example shows. For any balanced TU game v, define M 1 (v) as the set of players with lowest payoff in Lmax(v) and M 2 (v) as the set of players with second-lowest payoff in Lmax(v). We define ψ(v) = Lmax(v), unless M 1 (v) and M 2 (v) both consist of exactly one player. In this case, let k denote the unique player in M 1 (v) and let l denote the unique player in M 2 (v). Write
and define ψ(v) = x(λ * ). Clearly, ψ is a core concept. 8 In fact the proof is somewhat easier because the lexicographic ordering is applied directly to core elements x instead of to the ordered vector x.
Proposition 1 The core concept ψ satisfies ETP and IIC.
Proof To see that ψ satisfies ETP, suppose that players i and j are symmetric in v.
Since Lmax satisfies ETP, it is trivial that ψ(v)
. Now consider the case that there is a unique player k in M 1 (v) and a unique player l in M 2 (v). Since Lmax satisfies ETP, it follows that {i, j} has an empty intersection with {k, l}. Therefore,
Next, we show that ψ satisfies IIC. Suppose that games v and w are such that
It follows that Lmax(w) = Lmax(v). Then trivially, M 1 (w) and M 2 (w) are not both singleton sets, hence ψ(w) = Lmax(w) = Lmax(v) = ψ(v). Now assume that k is the unique player in M 1 (v) and l is the unique player in M 2 (v).
By definition of ψ(v), we have ψ(v)
and it even follows that Lmax(w) i = Lmax(v) i for all i = k, l.
Thus, we have
for some real numberμ. Note thatμ ≥ 0, since for µ < 0, (w) . This shows that k is the unique player in M 1 (w). We distinguish two cases for the number of players in M 2 (w).
A. M 2 (w) contains more than one player. This implies thatμ = λ * . It follows that
Note that y(µ) = x(µ +μ) for all µ. Therefore, we have
We also have µ * ≥ λ * −μ, since y(λ * −μ) = x(λ * ) = ψ(v) ∈ C(w), and
We verified that ψ satisfies IIC and ETP. To see that it is not egalitarian, consider the game v with player set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} defined by
It is easily verified that ψ(v) 1 = −7, ψ(v) 2 = −3 and ψ(v) i = 0 for all i ∈ N \{1, 2}, while the unique egalitarian allocation x is defined by x 1 = −6, x 2 = −4 and x i = 0 for all i ∈ N \ {1, 2}. We could neither prove nor disprove that a core concept with the properties of Theorem 2 is also a Lorenz concept.
An axiomatization of the LS solution concept
In this section, we will provide an axiomatization of the least squares solution concept. This will be done by replacing the axiom of continuity by another one that is closely related to additivity. We first show that egalitarianism is incompatible with additivity itself, as well as with its usual substitutes.
Example 2 Let v be the two-person game defined by v({1, 2}) = 2 and v({1}) = v({2}) = 0. The only egalitarian point in the core of this game is the allocation (1, 1) . Furthermore, let β be the additive game defined by β({1, 2}) = 0, β({1}) = 1 and β({2}) = −1. Then the only core element, and hence the only egalitarian allocation, is (1, −1). However, the only egalitarian allocation in the core of the game v + β is the allocation (1, 1), which is not equal to (1, 1) + (1, −1). The example is easily extended to games with n ≥ 2.
Hence, no egalitarian core concept satisfies additivity. The example also shows that no egalitarian core concept satisfies covariance under strategic equivalence, 9 not even the usual weak versions thereof. One way around this problem is the use of the following weak (and admittedly technical) version of additivity. A core concept φ is conditionally additive (CADD) if
for any two balanced games v and w with T (v, φ(v) (w, φ(w) ). Note that, in this case, the collection of tight coalitions at φ(v + w) in the game v + w equals the collection of tight coalitions at φ(v) in the game v.
Although the condition under which we require additivity in our CADD axiom is technical, there are core concepts that are conditionally additive in a natural way, while they do not satisfy additivity. For any solution concept φ on the class of balanced games, define the core concept P(φ) as the one that assigns to a balanced game v the unique allocation in C(v) for which the Euclidean distance to φ(v) is minimal.
Theorem 3 If φ is an additive solution concept, then P(φ) satisfies CADD.
Proof Define π = P(φ) and let v and w be two games such that 
. Let x, y denote the inner product of x and y. First we show , π(v) − φ(v) ≥ 0. Suppose the contrary. Since 
which completes the proof.
We already know that the LS solution satisfies IIC and ETP. It also follows from Theorem 3 that it satisfies CADD, since LS(v) = P(Es(v)), while the equal shares solution Es is clearly additive. Our objective now is to show that the LS concept is the only core concept on the class of balanced games that satisfies IIC, ETP and CADD.
We will first show that any core concept satisfying IIC, ETP and CADD must assign the core allocation LS for a collection of specific games. Let T be a collection of coalitions in N with ∅ ∈ T and N ∈ T . Take T ∈ T and κ > 0. Define the game w T,T ,κ by
It is easy to verify that the incidence vector e T of coalition T is an element of the core of the game w T,T ,κ . So, w T,T ,κ is balanced. Note however that this allocation need not be the only core element of w T,T ,κ . Nevertheless,
Lemma 4 Let φ be a core concept satisfying IIC, ETP and CADD, and let
It is easily verified that
Hence, by Lemma 2, we have φ(u * * ) = Es(u * * ). Furthermore, it is straightforward to check that
. Thus, applying CADD yields
On the other hand, it is easily verified that λe N = Es(u * + u * * ) ∈ C(u * + u * * ), so it follows from Lemma 2 that φ(u * + u * * ) = λe N . Contradiction. So, φ(u * ) = λe T . By choosing µ sufficiently large (µ ≥ λκ), we obtain u * ≤ λw T,T ,κ . Moreover, we have φ(u * ) = λe T ∈ C(λw T,T ,κ ). The lemma now follows from IIC.
Lemma 5 Let v be a balanced game and let T := T (v, LS(v)). Then there exist nonnegative numbers λ T (T ∈ T \ {N }) and a real number
Proof Recall that LS(v) is defined as the (unique) solution to the following minimization problem. Finally, observe that v ≥ w κ for sufficiently large κ, and that φ(w κ ) ∈ C(v). By taking a sufficiently large κ it follows from IIC that φ(v) = φ(w κ ) = LS(v).
In Sect. 4 we constructed a non-egalitarian core concept that satisfies IIC and ETP according to Proposition 1. To prove independence of the axioms that determine the LS concept, we conclude this paper with two examples; a core concept that satisfies IIC and CADD but not ETP, and a core concept that satisfies CADD and ETP but not IIC.
For an arbitrary player i ∈ N , let δ i denote the solution that assigns the vector v(N )e i to a game v. Clearly, the core concept P(δ i ) does not satisfy ETP. Since δ i is additive, it follows from Theorem 3 that P(δ i ) satisfies CADD. It is also easily verified that P(δ i ) satisfies IIC.
It is not difficult to prove that, if φ is a solution that satisfies ETP, then also P(φ) satisfies ETP. Denote the Shapley value by Sh. Then the core concept P(Sh) satisfies ETP (since Sh satisfies ETP) and CADD (by Theorem 3 and the fact that Sh is additive).
It is easy to demonstrate that P(Sh) does not satisfy IIC.
